Søren in Norwegen

4 Conclusion

In this paper I’ve presented an analysis which shows that nuclear power plants are economically not sustainable in a capitalistic society. Thus, as the historic data for the U.S. shows, during the heavy construction phase in the 70’s and 80’s almost half of the ca. 200 applied for nuclear power plants never got completed.
Further I’ve briefly shown that probably even the often praised capability to reduce GHG emission with nuclear power may be very much exaggerated since the production of nuclear fuel is dependend on the uranium content on the ore and the lower the uranium content the higher the energy needed to extract it.
Lastly I’ve presented some general points regarding the social non-sustainability of nuclear power.

Brook et al. mention in [14] six conditions for the economic viability of nuclear power.
The first condition (no unfair subsidies for renewable energy technologies) is discussed in section 3.1.
The second condition, that standardization will lower the costs, was shown not to be true in the case of the french nuclear fleet [23].
The third condition, that a long term governmental energy policy is needed, can be met just with wonder. This has in the U.S. always been the case. Starting with the famous „Atoms for Peace“-speech of President Eisenhower [55], vigorously advocating for legislation in favor of nuclear power in the 2000’s³² [38, 56], and lasting support until today [18]. Nonetheless seems nuclear power not to attract the interest of profit oriented investors.
Taking the devolpment of renewable energy technology into account³³, the fourth condition³⁴ may actually work to the disadvantage of nuclear power.
The fifth condition, that the sitings of nuclear power plants have to be carefully considered to avoid „areas most prone to severe natural hazards“ [14] could become a source for terrible mistakes due to the fact that climate change will lead to changing conditions in the landscape [57].³⁵
Finally the sixth condition³⁶ may also prove unfavourable for nuclear power, considering the still looming waste problem and the costs in case of a large scale desaster.

Finally nuclear power advocates put all hope into new technologies. However, regarding so called fast breeders Cochran et al. write in [58]: „After six decades and the expenditure of the equivalent of about $100 billion, the promise of breeder reactors remains largely unfulfilled“. They give examples of how the fast breeder programs in most states were abandoned or are (still) not promising. The same is true for Thorium reactors [59].

Finally to finish this report I’d like to mention some applications that actually make the utilization of nuclear power technology, especially reactors, necessary without an alternative. First and foremost these are nuclear weapons. If a country desires these, it needs the relevant technology.
Secondly, can the high neutron flux required for modern material research just be produced in nuclear reactors.
Thirdly, the radioactive isotopes, mainly molybdenum-99, needed in medicine are also produced in nuclear reactors. [60]
And the final reason I’d like to give here for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants is national pride and self-concept, as it was the case for France after the 2nd World War [61].
All of these application do not need to subdue to so called market mechanisms.

However, after a more or less two decade long trial and error periode, following the inauguration of nuclear power plants in the late 60’s, this technology was rejected by the market as means of producing electricity in an economically sustainable way. Or as Grubler et al. put it in [23]:

[…] [W]hile the nuclear industry is often quick to point at public opposition and regulatory uncertainty as reasons for real cost escalation, it may be more productive to start asking whether these trends are not intrinsic to the very nature of the technology itself: large-scale, lumpy, and requiring a formidable ability to manage complexity in both construction and operation. These intrinsic characteristics of the technology limit essentially all classical mechanisms of cost improvements–standardization, large series, and a large number of quasi-identical experiences that can lead to technological learning and ultimate cost reductions […] i.e., economies of scale.

Footnotes

1. 32. After the heavy construction phase of nuclear power plants was clearly over in the U.S. and it became obvious that commercial actors had no further intentions to build more nuclear reactors. ↩

2. 33. See for example the references given in footnote 19. ↩

3. 34. ‚[A] […] licensing process that is technology-neutral, risk-informed and capable of resolving promptly any safety issues that may arise during construction and operation‘ [14]. ↩

4. 35. Also the water availibility will change throughout the world. Both insufficent availability of water (drought) as well as too much (flood) will lead to non-operation of nuclear power plants. Considering the high costs of such installations this is obviously something that is not wished for by the investors. ↩

5. 36. The introduction of the concept of payment for ‚external costs‘ [14]. ↩

References

1. [14] B. W. Brook et al., „Why nuclear energy is sustainable and has to be part of the energy mix“, Sustainable Materials and Technologies, vol. 1-2, pp. 8–16, 2014. ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩

2. [18] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, „Information Digest 2016-2017, NUREG-1350“, vol. 28, 2016. ↩

3. [23] A. Grubler, „Energy Policy, vol. 38, pp. 5174–5188, 2010.“, The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing ↩ ↩

4. [38] Congressional Budget Office, „Nuclear Power`s Role in Generating Electricity“, Congress of the United States, 2008. ↩

5. [55] D. D. Eisenhower, „Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy“, 1953. ↩

6. [56] The National Commision on Energy Policy, „Ending the Energy Stalemate – A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America’s Energy Challenges“, 2004. ↩

7. [57] H. Bjordal and J. O. Larsen, „Avalanche risk in a changing climate – Development of a landslide and avalanche risk model“, International Snow Science Workshop Davos, 2009. ↩

8. [58] T. B. Cochran et al., „It`s Time to Give Up on Breeder Reactors“, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 66, pp. 50–56, 2010. ↩

9. [59] R. Alvarez, „Thorium: the wonder fuel that wasn`t“, Column at the webpage of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2014, (accessed 2017-07-20). ↩

10. [60] Nuclear Energy Agency, „A Supply and Demand Update of the Molybdenum-99 Market“, 2012. ↩

11. [61] G. Hecht, „The Radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II“, MIT Press, ISBN: 978-0-262-58281-0, 2009. ↩